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With the dust barely settled from the European elections, the horse-trading for the
most important EU-level positions has begun. Much of the analysis has focused on
one aspect of the election result: the fragmented European Parliament it leaves in its
wake. With the centre-left and centre-right parties shedding seats to other groupings,
it is undoubtedly far more difficult to crown one party as the ‘winner’ of this election,
justifying its lead candidate assuming the Commission’s Presidency. This will be a
‘coalition’ Parliament, with the support of several pro-European groupings necessary
for the EU’s legislative agenda to progress. In this sense, the result gave ammunition
to those eager to dump the 2014 Spitzenkandidaten system. If there is a clear
majority against each of the main Spitzenkandidaten, a process of inter-factional
bargaining between the Member States seems the only way forward.
Another aspect of the election result, however, seems just as important. If initial
calculations are correct, around 51% of Europeans voted in these elections. This
is a level that sits somewhere between the average for Mid-term and Presidential
US elections (a process that no-one would assume yields ‘second-order’ political
legitimacy). The elections were fought on themes – climate change, migration, ‘big
tech’ and the openness of economic borders – that were both shared between
European voters and which frame debates simultaneously at the national and
EU levels. For perhaps the first time, these were elections (including for populist
groupings) that were fundamentally about Europe. 
The results in short should give some pause to those who insist that Europe is a
demoi-cracy, in which the EU is a grouping of peoples ‘who govern together, but
not as one’. How can the answer of pro-European leaders to this exercise be the
very next day to cast it to one side, reserving the right to choose the individuals who
will guide EU politics for the next five years themselves? The results thus create
a paradox: they make a moral mockery of the Treaty-based right of EU leaders to
negotiate behind closed doors a candidate for the Commission Presidency. At the
same time, they do not provide a clear map on which candidate carries the direct
electoral legitimacy to rule in the name of Europe’s people.
In truth, this is not the first time this has happened. In 2014 too, the EPP left the
election without a majority in Parliament. Equally then, a coalition of leftist and liberal
pro-European parties could have mustered support in the European Parliament
for an alternative candidate. The choice of the main groupings, however, was to
stand firm behind the Spitzenkandidaten system, leading to Juncker’s confirmation.
Juncker followed with a vow, in his opening speech to the EP, to lead a ‘political’
Commission’ with a clearer political agenda. One way of evaluating whether to
do utilize this system again is to consider how it worked first time around: is there
evidence that the Spitzenkandidaten system, and the ‘political’ Commission that
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it created, undermined the Commission’s functions, or did it actually yield results
(or even improve the EU’s political legitimacy)? In short, to identify the way forward
benefits from looking at the past, namely at the ‘Juncker experiment’.
Casting Doubt on the ‘Political Commission’
The arguments against a political Commission are complex. In crude terms,
however, one can distinguish between arguments that the Commission cannot
do politics and those positing that it should not do so. The first set of arguments
mainly concern the Commission’s legal and institutional context. This context
severely limits the very ability of the Commission to be politically responsive. The
Treaties significantly circumscribe the areas in which the EU can act meaning that
the Commission may simply be unable to advance proposals to meet some of the
key concerns of voters (or may only do so in a limited manner). This problem is
further exacerbated by the way in which many Treaty articles are drafted. Many
not only circumscribe the areas in which the EU institutions can act but tell them
how to act. To give one example, the Articles on EMU anchor EU policy in this area
in principles of budgetary responsibility and the avoidance of moral hazard. Thus,
a Commission or Central Bank that wanted to reverse conditionality in response
to the verdict of voters would not only be taking a political risk but potentially be
acting unconstitutionally. Finally, the structure of the Commission fits uneasily
with a politicised policy-making process. A Commission President, of whatever
political stripe, must direct Commissioners of varying political persuasions, with the
segmentation of the Commission into separate DGs creating a well know silo effect
(making it difficult to prioritise policies). In this sense, the Commission may simply be
unable to align its policy-making with the general views of EU citizens.
A second set of arguments runs even deeper. Even if the Commission could cast
aside these constraints, perhaps it should not do so given the nature of the tasks
it has to fulfil. Principally, the Treaties assign to the Commission the task of being
a ‘guardian of the Treaties’. This nebulous task demands that the Commission
impartially enforces EU law, that it acts as an honest broker between states in
the law-making process and that it intervenes in areas such as competition and
state aid in the general European interest. These sets of tasks seem to require the
Commission to be a neutral regulator (or as the CJEU has recently put it, a ‘good
administrator’). This sits uneasily with a Commission whose success depends on
the support of political majorities, which could be seen as improperly prejudicing
regulatory decisions (when the Commission for example must decide whether to
deem illegal state aid to a company employing thousands or when applying rule of
law standards against a popular domestic government). These arguments contest
the desirability of politicization and with it, the legitimacy of selecting the Commission
President through partisan means.
Juncker’s Political Commission
These arguments seem compelling in the abstract. They are, however, less
convincing (yet on some points more convincing) when assessed against the
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experience of Juncker’s ‘political’ Commission. Let us deal with the first, capacity-
based, set of objections first. In answer to these objections, there is some evidence
that the Juncker Commission was relatively successful in focusing its political
agenda, achieving results in areas of importance to voters. To deal with ‘silo’
problems, Juncker introduced a Vice-President system with both ‘area’ VPs
(responsible for groupings of portfolios) and a ‘first’ VP (whose go-ahead was
needed for initiatives to advance). This was guided by 10 ‘flagship’ projects and
a series of work programmes agreed with the other main EU institutions. This
significantly slimmed the legislative agenda, with fewer proposals advanced, the
majority of which related to the flagship items. There was also a clear ideological
spin placed on certain policy items. Juncker’s politics – as a centrist Christian
democrat, committed to a social market economy – was felt in initiatives like the
‘Pillar of Social Rights’, which represents a first legislative breakthrough on EU social
matters for almost two decades.
The difficulty was when these key areas were overtaken by events. The danger
mentioned above – of the public demanding an EU response to a problem, only for
the EU to be legally or politically unable to do so – raised its head, most notably
in the context of the refugee crisis. Here, the Commission experienced serious
capacity and legitimacy deficits. On the capacity side, its typical toolbox (harmonizing
rules) was totally inadequate for the scale of the policy challenge. On the legitimacy
side, the Member States soon realised the political salience of more ambitious
initiatives on re-location, forcing them to increasingly control the policy agenda (most
notoriously through the Turkey agreement). An EP study of the implementation
of the flagship projects re-enforces the point: projects in more traditional areas of
competence (such as the single market) carry high implementation rates whereas
those touching on salient distributive issues or requiring the extensive cooperation
of the Member States or Third States, fare poorly. The Juncker Commission was
therefore able to ‘do politics’ but only within the (still limited) political space that the
Treaties provide. 
What about the second, normative, set of objections? Opinions may vary on
whether, empirically speaking, the politicization of the Commission has undermined
its regulatory legitimacy. Certainly when dealing with issues such as rule of law
backsliding, the political alliance between Juncker’s EPP and Viktor Orban’s Fidesz
has been of little help. There may be perceptions of regulatory bias. This remains
a Commission, however, that has taken highly unpopular political decisions, and
paid a political price for doing so. At the time of writing, for example, Margrethe
Vestager’s candidacy for the Commission Presidency is hanging in the balance
owing to seeming opposition from Ireland (angry at her fining of a corporate tax
hand-out to Apple) and a cool Emmanuel Macron (who opposed her decision to
block the merger between Siemens and Alstom). 
More broadly, it is difficult, if not impossible, to base the legitimacy of the
contemporary Commission on its abilities as an impartial regulator alone. Not
only are we living through an age where the notion of a single objective body of
rationale knowledge to found regulatory decisions is increasingly contested. We
also live in an EU engaged in distributive politics (as Juncker, dealing with issues
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from the distribution of refugees to macro-economic divergence, quickly found out).
Distributive politics requires choices, and those choices inevitably will be weighed
and viewed differently depending on the political views of citizens and officials. The
politicization of the Commission may in this sense threaten regulatory legitimacy but
seems the ‘only game in town’ given the challenges European leaders expect the
Commission to solve.
Throwing the Baby Out with the Bathwater?
Where does this leave the Spitzenkandidaten system? What it reveals is that
many objections to the system are not really objections to the democratization
and politicization of the Commission as such. Rather, they suggest even more
radical attempts to democratize the EU. First, regarding the ‘capacity-based’ set of
objections, if the principle barrier to politicization are the heavy restrictions on the
EU’s competences, this seems a reason to re-visit the competence debate (or even
to provide a general legislative competence, coupled with higher decision-making
thresholds, as others have suggested). Second, regarding ‘normative’ objections, if a
further barrier to politicization is the politicization of regulatory tasks, this would seem
a reason to more clearly separate out the Commission’s distributive and regulatory
functions (providing the latter set of functions, or even responsible DGs, with higher
operational independence).
Finally, if the problem is the unclear result these elections have provided, the
solution does not seem to be to ignore them but to devise a better system for
aggregating preferences e.g. through giving citizens a second ‘direct’ vote not only
for their MEPs but for their preferred Spitzenkandidat. The European Council carries
another important function: it is the initiator of Treaty reform. An ambitious Council
would consider whether some of these items should be actioned.
If, as seems likely, all of these things are too much for EU leaders to stomach, they
might remember that, last time too, they were bounced into accepting someone
who they felt was an unattractive and incompetent candidate. What they got was a
competent leader, who steered the Union through a number of difficult challenges
(not least the Brexit process) and who delivered in 2019 an EU that seems (at least
in the short term) to have stood united against its populist opponents. By giving up
on the Spitzenkandidaten system, the Union would also give up on an important and
ongoing experiment in nourishing its democratic foundations (without the guarantee
that a better candidate would emerge as a result). When sitting their next difficult
meeting, the European Council may consider whether that is a price worth paying.
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